

Abstract: *Albania had a very specific situation with respect to its foreign policy during 1946. This paper has two parts and the first part mostly deals with the first half of 1946 as the crucial year that marked the alignment of Albania during the entire Cold War. It really was a very hard time, especially after the communists took power in late November 1944. It was a crucial year concerning the problems Albania had to be officially recognized from the Western Allies. The communist regime that was installed at the end of 1944 after the liberation from the Nazi Germany, led the country in the wrong direction. The Albanian government sought the salvation of the country by relying on the aid of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, where in fact the major help to recover from the ruins of the war were coming from the Western Allies, especially from UNRRA. Through original archive documents, most of them being presented for the first time, this first part of the paper tries to shed light on one of the most crucial periods of post war Albania, giving the reasons why the communist leadership turned down the relations with the West by totally relying on the East. The methodology used in presenting this paper is analytically based on archival sources to present a thorough research on that dark period of Albania's foreign policy.*

Keywords: *Albania, diplomacy, recognition, Western Allies, UNRRA, Greece, United Nations.*

Introduction - An overview on the international situation of Albania in the first months of 1946

1946 was a year with sharp problems concerning Albania's foreign policy. The main problem was beyond any doubt the exacerbation of the relations with Greece. Concerning this aggravation, the prime minister Hoxha on March 10th had given an interview in the "Bashkimi/the Unity" newspaper, and thereafter this interview of his was ordered to be studied within the party organization.¹

1 *Arkivi Qendror i Shtetit i Republikës së Shqipërisë/The Central National Archive of the Republic of Albania* (hereinafter: AQSH), Fund (hereinafter: f.) 14/Strukturat/Structures (hereinafter: Str), Year (hereinafter: Y.) 1946, File (hereinafter: F.) 131/2, page (hereinafter: p.) 1. Instructions with radiogram from the Central Committee of

Though he had overwhelmingly won the elections of December 2nd 1945, Hoxha still was not succeeding to crown his achievement to make Albania join the United Nations Organization (hereinafter: UN) as a permanent member. In a speech he kept in front of the People's Assembly (parliament) in March 1946, the Albanian premier expressed his surprise that why the US Secretary of State Stettinius and the British Foreign Minister Bevin, still were not taking into consideration Albania's membership in the UN.² According to him, the only delegates that supported Albania's membership were the Soviets, the Yugoslavs and the Polish.³

The issue of Albania's foreign policy was also discussed in the V Plenum of the Central Committee on 21 February 1946. One of the most active participants in this meeting was Liri Belishova, who said that nonetheless Albania had chosen the path of socialism after the Yugoslav and Soviet models, and should know how to protect its interests.⁴ The connection with both countries would make possible according to Belishova the recognition of the war Albania has waged and the reason why it should exist as a state.⁵ One of the main problems Albania would face in its foreign policy were the war criminals as the Albanian government called them.⁶

The latter created problems for the Albanian government because many of those "war criminals" were living in Italy. With the neighboring country in the Adriatic, the new Albanian government had no political relations. Italy has been an aggressor and had occupied Albania for a period of four years and was not yet signed the peace treaty between the two countries. Because for the 1946 the economic demands of Albania were urgent and the country was passing through big difficulties even as consequences of the wrong governmental policies, on 18 March 1946, the prime minister Hoxha addressed a letter to the three foreign ministers of the Great Powers gathered in London in order for them to push forward the signing of the peace treaty and Italy to pay to Albania the war reparations.⁷

the Albanian Communist Party sent to the Party's District committees about Enver Hoxha's interview concerning the Greek claims in the Security Council of UN.

2 *Arkivi i Ministrisë për Europën dhe Punët e Jashtme i Republikës së Shqipërisë/The Archive of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs* (hereinafter: AMEPJ), Year (hereinafter: Y.) 1946, File (hereinafter: F.) 28, page (hereinafter: p.) 68. Enver Hoxha's speech in the People's Assembly taken from "Bashkimi" newspaper, 25 March 1946.

3 *Ibid.*

4 *AQSH*, f. 14/Organet Udhëheqëse/Leading Bodies (hereinafter: OU), Y. 1946, F. 1/1, p. 69. On Albania's foreign policy.

5 *Ibid.*, p. 70.

6 *Ibid.*

7 *AQSH*, f. 490/Council of Ministers (hereinafter: KM), Y. 1946, F. 2, p. 1-2. Note of the Albanian government sent to the foreign ministers of the Great Powers in London to settle the peace treaty with Italy and the war reparations to be paid from Italy as a

On 25 March 1946, Enver Hoxha in the quality of the People's Republic of Albania (hereinafter: PRA) prime minister and minister of Foreign Affairs, had presented in the People's Assembly the government's foreign policy plan and this plan it was to be studied and discussed from all the members of the party by organizing small conferences in factories, schools with the relevant comments.⁸

Every speech of Enver Hoxha was considered as very urgent and as such would be considered the following one of 7 April 1946 where the prime minister would speak in the general meeting of the People's Front Organization and everybody in the country had to listen his speech through speakers and immediately would be organized general meetings throughout the streets to support his speech.⁹

Also, the discussion in the press would have the visit of Enver Hoxha in Belgrade in June 1946, and his meeting with the leader of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito would be widely broadcasted.¹⁰ On the occasion of the New Year, on December 31st, Hoxha would directly address the Albanian people through the radio broadcast and this event was considered of the utmost importance and everybody must hear his message. Immediately after the New Year message, would follow a general discussion in order to be widely popularized.¹¹

The problems with UNRRA Albania's biggest concern in foreign policy for 1946

The foreign policy of Albania was widely discussed, but in the most possible non professional way in the VI Plenum that was held in April 25-27, 1946 in Tirana.¹² In this Plenum, Enver Hoxha presented the international situation as very fluctuating. Hoxha clearly stated in the meeting that the note that was sent to the American government from the Albanian government for the recognition of the previous treaties signed between the two countries was the essential condition for the establishment of the diplomatic relations between the two countries.¹³ A little bit easier were

consequence of invasion.

8 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1946, F. 131/2, p. 2. Radiogram from Nako Spiru on 26 March 1946: "To the District Committee of the ACP, all the Districts. The speech of comrade Enver Hoxha at the People's Assembly, on the program of the new government, published in *Bashkimi* on 25 March, to be studied from all the party members. Should be organized conferences in factories, manufactures, schools, villages etc., for further comments".

9 *Ibid*, p. 3.

10 *Ibid*, p. 4.

11 *Ibid*, p. 5.

12 *AQSH*, f. 14/OU, Y. 1946, F. 2, p. 47. On the international situation of Albania.

13 *Ibid*.

presented by Hoxha the relations with Great Britain by clearly stating that “they have recognized us, we know this fact”.¹⁴ The problem was the Albanian government was not accepting from Great Britain the people sheltered there because according to Hoxha “they all have supported the reactionary forces”.¹⁵

Concerning the establishment of the diplomatic relations with Great Britain, according to Hoxha was directly involved the former prime minister of Albania in exile Theofan Stilian Noli who also sent a telegram to the Albanian government for the latter to accept the conditions of England, because if this was fulfilled, Britain would lobby for Albania to be accepted in the UN.¹⁶ The same thing was to be done with the USA. However, for Hoxha this fact created a problem for him. Why? Openly in the Plenum the Albanian premier quoted a previous agreement of the Albanian government with the American government in 1922 in which the USA were granted the most favored nation in trading with Albania.¹⁷

This was a very big problem for Hoxha. He had chosen which path Albania would have to follow under his leadership. If the treaties that were signed prior 1939 would be accepted by the actual government, for sure his power would not be that long. Nevertheless, even with the Americans he wouldn't dare to break off that quickly the relations because the country would be further isolated. The only country that had recognized the Albanian government until that time was Yugoslavia and not only that but had granted the Albanian government the possibility to join wherever Yugoslavia had diplomatic representations, Albania within Yugoslav legations could send her own representatives.¹⁸

Also concerning UNRRA, Koçi Xoxe (the second of the chain of command after Hoxha in the party and government) stated that the relations with that organization were not good.¹⁹ The most debatable problem concerning

14 *Ibid.*

15 *Ibid.* Excerpt from the speech of Enver Hoxha: “Also the question of the British minister coming here, they sought also to envoy Smith, but the question was that these people had helped the reactionary forces”.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 48. “Meantime, Noli’s telegrams continue to come every three days”.

17 *Ibid.*

18 *Ibid.*, p. 49.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 50. Excerpt from Koçi Xoxe’s speech: “Concerning UNRRA and with the others we are not good as Enver said, and they are asking things from us; if we don't give them, they don't give us. They want to come here for different things, as for example, the Czechoslovaks came for the question of snakes; but we have refused everything. They enter freely in Yugoslavia, but are checked from inside the country. This is the situation with the British and the Americans, with the Soviets and with the Yugoslavs. It's known, but we need to have wider connections with the press. For Bulgaria we have to speak more”.

the deterioration of Albania's international situation and above all with the Western allies was the departure of UNRRA's mission at the end of 1946 after the Corfu Channel incident. Concerning this serious incident, the departure of UNRRA meant leaving Albania without food because since the start of the mission the organization has delivered to Albania thousand tons of food and aids for Albanians, so this movement would have had grave repercussions of the small Balkan country relations with the United States of America and the Great Britain. Indeed, the aggravation of relations with UNRRA from the Albanian communist leadership had started since February 1946. Koçi Xoxe himself, through a secret radiogram of 12 February 1946, instructed all the districts of the country to take all the necessary precautions that all the sections of propaganda near the Executive Committees should not have close cultural relations with the American and British missions or with UNRRA.²⁰ Not only that, but Xoxe ordered that also the propaganda officials should never have or establish friendly relations with the Anglo-American officials or with those of UNRRA.²¹

The propaganda problem of the people working within UNRRA, was a primal problem for the Party's Central Committee. Following the instructions of 2 March 1946, Xoxe again, according to the information coming from the party structures in the villages and towns, warned about the movements of UNRRA's missionaries through Albania as a maneuver to bypass the national officials in order to establish direct relations with the people.²² Xoxe demanded that UNRRA should be discredited by all means among the people because it was obstructing the job of the Albanian government in the distribution of aids and he went that far to demand that UNRRA's aids were not fulfilling even the minimal needs of the Albanian people.²³ Finally, it was admitted by Xoxe that to achieve this, it was impossible to establish a police cordon between the UNRRA's officials and the Albanian people, but the latter should be "educated" to refuse the aid of the organization.²⁴

20 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1946, F. 152, p. 1. Instructions from the Central Committee sent to the Districts Committees concerning the attitude it should be kept towards UNRRA's activity and some information reports from the Districts Committees sent to the Central Committee on the efforts and the hostile activity of the UNRRA's envoys in Albania.

21 *Ibid.* Excerpt from Koçi Xoxe's radiogram: "Not only the offices shouldn't have such connections but you should work in a way that the propaganda officials should not have friends with them. In this way we stop their efforts to intervene, to have friends, to establish their agents and through books, magazines and other materials we should make our own propaganda among the people".

22 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

23 *Ibid.*

24 *Ibid.*

From this instruction (order) of Koçi Xoxe, would start an unprecedented surveillance on every movement from the officials of UNRRA from the Sigurimi agents and Tirana would be regularly informed on every initiative of theirs to distribute food among the people.²⁵ In fact, the standard of living of the Albanian people was not making the duty easy to the CPA members. In a report coming from Spiro Pano in Shkodra, the center was informed that the inhabitants of Mata shore complained to UNRRA envoys over the bad economic situation and the American officials had taken pictures of the inhabitants homes and to the people in order to have as much they could information about their economic situation and on the economic potential of Albania's different regions.²⁶ In Puka, a woman from UNRRA when asked for a meeting with the people of the district in Qerret, faced hostile attitudes from the inhabitants there which were instructed from the elements coming from Shkodra's Executive Committee.²⁷ As if that was not enough, the communist officials turned the meeting with the official of UNRRA into a popular manifestation where was ardently expressed "the love for Enver and demanding to be sent to him a telegram where had to be expressed the love and loyalty of the people towards the leader".²⁸

In every area of Albania where the delegates of UNRRA were going to control the distribution of the food, they were facing different obstructions from the Executive Committees officials. In Peshkopia, the American officials were forbidden to inspect the distribution of the food with the pretexts that "we have order from the government".²⁹ Only when UNRRA's officials would be escorted from members of the Central Committee, there wouldn't be problems or manifestations against them.³⁰ As it's seen,

25 *Ibid*, p. 3.

26 *Ibid*, p. 4. Excerpt from Koçi Xoxe's radiogram sent to all the District Committees on 28 March 1946: "The Council of Ministers in its memorandum Nr. 95 of 21/II/1946, has informed all the Executive Committees, demonstrating very well which is the function of UNRRA's agents when they go to the districts. These agents have insisted to intervene in the affairs of the Executive Committees, also it has been noticed that these agents in different covert ways seek to be informed on the economic potential of different regions. You have to understand that these agents are not simple spectators of food distribution and have no right or competence to give orders, to intervene and to influence the distribution. Try not to give a single information that is at our detriment. Stop".

27 *Ibid*, fl. 5. "The Government has given and continues to give us help. Without this government we could have starved. We only ask why we're not invited to UNRRA's conference? Have we not fought together with the allies? Why the allies do not recognize us?"

28 *Ibid*.

29 *Ibid*, p. 6.

30 *Ibid*, p. 7. "Radiogram from Pandi Kristo to Xhorxhi Blushi in Berat, on 31 May 1946: Monday morning on 3/VI/1946 passes from Berat to Këlcyra comrade Nako

had started a hostile propaganda and a severe surveillance of UNRRA's officials in Albania. An exception was only when the foreign officials were accompanied by the party members and their visit was organized in the smallest details, but not in the presence of the people or of the organized manifestations.³¹ When the officials of UNRRA were asking to be informed during their visits in the districts, they were officially notified for things in general and never in detail from the men of the party according to the instructions they've received from the Executive Committees and from the Central Committee in Tirana.³²

The problems with neighboring Greece

The issue of relations with Greece concerning the Greek claims for Albania's southern territories, made urgent the coming of a UN special commission. The greatest concern for the Albanian government concerning the divergences with the southern neighbor country was also the statement of the American senator Vandenberg which had declared before the commission of Foreign Affairs on 27 March 1946 that Dodecanese and Northern Epirus should be given to Greece.³³ Still more disturbing was the information that the above mentioned commission has manifested its sympathy for the "Northern Epirus" question.³⁴ This was the reason why the visit of the UN delegation was of a cardinal importance to the issue of southern Albania. In a radiogram sent to all the districts of the country, but in the document is presented without signature and no name, they were instructed by all the chiefs of districts to inform the people in advance.³⁵ The entire problem was to avoid at all costs the incidents that may take place for not having clashes between the men of power and the UN envoys. To have a much easier hand on this delicate matter, the entire propaganda, radio, press and the Albanian Telegraphic Agency (Agjencia Telegrafike Shqiptare, hereinafter: ATSH), would always broadcast "the necessary" arguments.³⁶ The people should be conscientious that the goal of this mission was only for the question with Greece, nothing more. The commission would simply investigate the turmoil that was happening in

together with one person working for UNRRA. If they stay in Berat they should not be manifestations. Pay attention to Berat-Këlcyra segment".

31 *Ibid*, p. 8, 9.

32 *Ibid*, p. 10.

33 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 128/2, p. 1. Study documents on Northern Epirus and the Greek-Albanian border.

34 *Ibid*.

35 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1946, F. 152, p. 11.

36 *Ibid*.

the Albanian-Greek border and that's it.³⁷ Albania's attitude during the time when this commission would stay for its investigation would be the following:

1. Against the provocation and slanders towards Albania;
2. Against the Northern Epirus organization that was established in Greece;
3. Against the fact that the Albanian war criminals were kept there (in Greece) and encouraged to act against Albania;
4. Against the Greek attitude towards Albania in Paris;
5. On the question of the Çam population;
6. On the attitudes of Anglo-Americans against Albania.³⁸

When the commission would come to Albania, it should not be treated as a problem of great importance, but as a matter that would investigate the border problems between the two countries. Concerning this issue, the districts that received the most instructions and who should pay more attention were those of Korça, Gjirokastra and Vlora.³⁹ Albanian diplomacy should be prepared with incontestable arguments to present all the evidence why Korça and Gjirokastra were inseparable part of Albania's economy and the role these two cities had played in Albania's economic viability.⁴⁰ The data above all on ethnography, geography, history and economy on these two cities would be a strong basis in the negotiations that would be held to turn down the Greek claims.⁴¹ Very important for Albania were the statements of Sir Robert Hodgson who declared in BBC on 22 August 1946 that Southern Albania was never Greek.⁴² Concerning the

37 *Ibid.*

38 *Ibid.*

39 *Ibid.* The last part of the radiogram instructs the districts of Korça, Gjirokastra and Vlora: "Our attitude towards the Commission should be correct. We should watch over the insults, we should pay attention that their staying must only focus within the matter for which they are here. The issue of the Commission should not be treated as a big thing, which preoccupies us. This must be avoided. Anyway, the members of the Party should know how to keep their attitude, to inform the people and to struggle against the reactionary forces' slogans. We repeat that the Party members should follow the press and there they should get the further daily instructions. This explanation for the Commission and the propaganda around it should be given even in the usual meetings of the cells. Especially the organizations of the Korça, Gjirokastra and Vlora prefectures should pay special attention. It should be organized special meetings of the propaganda men to better emphasize this matter".

40 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 128/3, p. 31. The matter of Northern Epirus and newspapers editions from Washington Post, 11 March 1946, The Manchester Guardian nr. 150 and ethnographic quotations.

41 *Ibid.*, p. 32, 56.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 139. Concerning the Greek claims on "Northern Epirus"; see also *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 128/4.

negotiations that would be held in New York about the matter of northern Greece was invited to participate without the right of vote by the Albanian delegate in the UN, Hysni Kapo.⁴³

The issue of Albania's recognition in the international arena was considered as a process of great importance above all for the party⁴⁴ and not as a process of foreign policy. Even on this matter, the party should take care when the country is not yet internationally recognized and the Peace Conference has not yet started. The international recognition of Albania was not only dependent on internal goodwill. Though the government led by Enver Hoxha was trying to present the country as an independent factor, still it was impossible to deny that the foreign policy of the Albanian state depended a lot from the assistance the Soviet Union would provide together with Yugoslavia in order that both these countries could lobby for the international recognition of Albania.⁴⁵ For the 1946 and waiting for the Peace Conference to start in Paris, the Albanian government based its strategy on foreign policy on three main principles:

1. Albania was an independent factor, but was aware that could not play any important role in the international politics;
2. Albania's foreign policy depended a lot from the job that Soviet Union and Yugoslavia would do in her assistance;
3. The foreign policy of Albania would be based on the protection that could do to herself in a way to make it easier for its friends to defend her.⁴⁶

These three principles at first sight looked easy, but were clearly partial and totally based on the help from the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. None of these principles included what kind of politics should the country follow with the Western powers because the latter were they who helped the most in the national-liberation war and have delivered considerable aid in food and clothes for the Albanian people through UNRRA. Unfortunately, the partiality would be "the foundation stone" of Albania's foreign policy until the fall of the communist regime in the country. Concerning the drafting strategy about the recognition of Albania, as for Great Britain, above

43 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 128/5, p. 109. On the matter of Northern Epirus. Letter from A. Sobolev, Assistant to the General Secretary of the UN to Hysni Kapo, 16 December 1946.

44 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str; Y. 1946, F. 152/1, p. 1. Report and working plans for the international recognition of Albania and the attitude of the Albanians abroad concerning this matter.

45 *Ibid.*

46 *Ibid.* "With this we want to say that what they do to directly support our question even indirectly because with this we can take advantage from their general policy ...Here we stress that by watching more widely this matter and not only from the narrow nationalistic question, we can give some help to the Democratic countries because we will always be a vote for them".

mentioned principles did not consider the great island of the West as a key point where to base for recognition, but accused it of presenting bent facts against the Albanian national liberation war.⁴⁷ Also, Greece was considered as a calumnious country and supporter of the Albanian reactionary forces. These things according to the Albanian government strategy has made for Albania to have few friends abroad, the task presented to be difficult and the Albanian colonies in the world knew little about Albania.⁴⁸ The strategy stressed the fact that the situation of the country in the international arena was difficult and would be impossible to organize a diplomatic protection of the country in front of the world opinion and thus, Albania would fall into total oblivion and its opponents would ignore her existence.⁴⁹

For these reasons, it was necessary for Albanian diplomacy to be active in order to make known to the world its national-liberation war and in this way to protect her rights and interests by becoming a member of the UN.⁵⁰ Part of this strategy should be the strengthening of friendship with the democratic (viz communist) countries by establishing diplomatic relations with them.⁵¹ The Greek claims, the reparations of war, the displaced Çam population, the foreign trade etc., should be not treated separately, but as one.⁵² In all these three strategic aims, the problems were big and mismanaged. As were not enough all the stalemates that the Albanian diplomacy was going through at that time, the strategy recommended the way how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs work and within the Central Committee should be established the commission for foreign affairs who would supervise the entire foreign policy of the country.⁵³ This strategy was head over heels wrong because leading the foreign policy of a country through ideology and not by pragmatic realism, would mean to bring its diplomacy into the brink of the abyss. The ideology, especially the radical one, is totally unacceptable for the foreign policy of a country. The national interests, instead of better suited with the interest of other Western powers by preserving the normal national dignity, would turn into a party appendix becoming ridiculous for as long as the Cold War would exist.

For most Albanians living abroad, this strategy considered them enemies

47 *Ibid.* "Abroad, Albania is not recognized, there are only few facts on our war and for the present situation in Albania. The others (the British) have shown to the world what they wanted to show about us, certainly nothing true".

48 *Ibid.*

49 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

50 *Ibid.*

51 *Ibid.*

52 *Ibid.*

53 *Ibid.*

of the country and the collaboration was unthinkable.⁵⁴ The Albanian colonies were considered from this strategy as “the Achilles heel” and indeed were qualified to be under the influence of reactionary emigration.⁵⁵ About the Albanians of the foreign colonies was recommended to be sent a propaganda information in the form of letters that would receive from their friends and relatives living in Albania, while for the reactionary element it should be pursued the “divide and rule” policy by sending among them six or seven communist students or other elements.⁵⁶

Indeed, the strategy recommended increasing the contacts with the friends of Albania in England, Czechoslovakia, America, Switzerland and in France. While for the friends in Yugoslavia, the problem was not posed in the same way as with the above mentioned countries because the relations with this country were taking another trend.⁵⁷ Was important according to this strategy that the official Albanian diplomacy to approach the industrial and especially the intellectual circles of the countries above in order to make use of their prestige to defend the territorial integrity of the country in order to have a big supportive voice guaranteeing the independence of Albania.⁵⁸ However there was a paradox. Was given the recommendation that for those western countries Albania should not open the doors and above all it should be done everything to obstruct them from entering into contacts with the groups of the Albanian emigration abroad, especially with the former king Ahmet Zogu.⁵⁹ The approach with these groups according to the strategy of Albania’s foreign policy should be done only through propaganda and not at all even with the modest financial investments. Also, the strategy went even further into extreme when recommended that after the passing of the first existing phase, should be posed the question of trust in order to obtain some benefits, otherwise the doors of cooperation should be immediately shut.⁶⁰ The megalomania

54 *Ibid*, p. 3. “All these are fugitives together with Zogu all live in different countries. All these and especially those of London should be considered as British agents. Our enemies are reactionaries and criminals that escaped from the country. In Italy there are approximately 2000 Albanians students included. Also in Greece there are approximately 700 fugitives. All these act against us”.

55 *Ibid*. “Albanians abroad in general have a good attitude, but they are not clear about the internal situation because they have no information from us. The Albanian colonies abroad have very little information for Albania, there the reactionary forces are making double-dealing and have started to watch with fear the international situation of Albania”.

56 *Ibid*.

57 *bid*.

58 *Ibid*, p. 4.

59 *Ibid*.

60 *Ibid*. “With them we have to work: a) By sending propaganda material and information

of this so-called “strategy” went into the limits of the unthinkable when it was stressed that with those groups of interests the work should be done in such a way in order to reform them with true democratic elements!⁶¹

It should be said that the Albanian diplomacy until the end of the communist regime in Albania remained simple in the terms of propaganda and totally isolated from the reality of international relations. The efforts to publish magazines or booklets, or to recruit journalists in the foreign press to write about Albania, was given the recommendation to be done only through propaganda and not with important investments.⁶² The same, without any kind of investment the propaganda of Albania should be supported by the delegations of the Albanian Red Cross, the antifascist organization or the Albanian associations abroad as the students and the friends of Albania.⁶³ All this work that from the drafted strategy was called “great” should absolutely be organized from the center (Tirana) and for this should be established a governmental information department with an entire apparatus in its support. For the propaganda abroad, it was necessary and absolutely recommended to establish propaganda stations in Moscow, Paris, London and in the USA and possibly even in Belgrade. In these countries, the Albanian embassies should be equipped with complete personnel and should be strong.⁶⁴

The reason of Albania’s communist government failure to be officially recognized from the Western Allies

The participation of Albania in international organizations and conferences was another part of the drafted strategy to make known the country in the international arena.⁶⁵ In all this so-called strategy, there was no part that stressed how financial expenses should have been made to apply and fulfill it and there was no concrete plan to make it work and how the necessary apparatus should be established.⁶⁶

and continuously encouraging them for some kind of work. They can publish some books on Albania etc. b) Our ambassadors in those countries where such associations exist should know how to work with them and how to use them”.

61 *Ibid.*

62 *Ibid.*

63 *Ibid*, p. 5.

64 *Ibid.*

65 *Ibid.*

66 *Ibid*, p. 6. “In this way we concluded our job that aimed to study the external problem of the State and drafting a concrete plan in front of the Party concerning this problem. At the end we repeat what we have been saying since the beginning that we consider important at this time to be taken under the consideration of the study and to be reorganized the external service by establishing the necessary apparatus for this job”.

To build a modern, independent and efficacious diplomatic service was a hard enterprise for Albania in the conditions when her diplomatic experience was very weak. In establishing a new diplomacy as was aiming the Albanian communist government in the first half of 1946, the only advantage that the country had was when it would present in the Peace Conference of Paris which would start its proceedings in May, the statement of December 1942 of the three foreign ministers of the allied countries (USA, Great Britain and the Soviet Union), where was solemnly declared that was praised the war of the Albanian people, and that Albania would become again independent and that the Allies wouldn't recognized no changes that were made to the status of Albania after the April 7th 1939.⁶⁷ The Albanian government thought that after the war, Albania's independence and territorial integrity had nothing to be contested, but it was wrong. Even concerning the form of the regime, the Albanian government considered that matter an internal affair of the Albanian people within the principles declared from the Big Three.⁶⁸

The UN hadn't recognized yet the government of Enver Hoxha, though the country was liberated from the Nazi occupation in November 1944. In the first meeting of the United Nations General Assembly that was held in London on 10 January 1946, Albania presented its demand to be accepted as a member, but her request was turned down from the British and American delegates, but was supported by the Soviets and the Polish.⁶⁹ Also, the irritated relations with UNRRA served as a big obstruction for Albania's membership and in March 1946, the British, American and French delegates declared that Albania couldn't be accepted in the UNRRA's Assembly Council because a member of it (Greece) was still in the state of war with Albania.⁷⁰ This fact was also put in evidence during the examination of Albania's candidacy in the UN on August 9th 1946 where specific questions were posed about the state of war between Greece and Albania and how the latter thought to solve it.⁷¹ The decision for not accepting Albania as a UN member was firstly presented by Great Britain

67 *Ibid*, p. 7.

68 *Ibid*. "The establishment of the internal regime of Albania is an internal affairs of the Albanian people in complete concordance with the proclaimed principles of the Big Allies since the time of the Atlantic Charter and beyond".

69 *Ibid*, p. 8. "In the first meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations that was opened in London on 10 January 1946, Albania posed the demand to be accepted as a member. it was not accepted because of the objection posed from the Anglo-Americans and of some other countries, despite the protection from Vyshinski and of the Polish delegate, and it was postponed".

70 *Ibid*.

71 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 58, p. 57. On the examination of Albania's demand for membership in the UN, 9 August 1946.

on 28 January 1946 because it was considered a country in a state of war with Greece.⁷² This matter was considered as very important and sought for its solution even by the American Secretary of State Stettinius.⁷³ Albania's only hope in this matter relied on the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ During September 1946, the Foreign Ministry of Albania, informed its representative at the UN about the incidents occurring in the border with Greece that were caused by the latter in order to present them as evidence in the debates concerning the issue of the state of war between Greece and Albania.⁷⁵

The first government from the liberated countries who officially recognized the Albanian government was the Yugoslav at the end of April 1945.⁷⁶ On 10 November 1945, the Soviet Union was the next in line who recognized Albania without posing a single condition and proceeded with the exchange of diplomatic representatives.⁷⁷ On the same day, even the government of Great Britain stated that it would recognize the government of Albania, but with the condition after being held free and fair elections. Though the elections were held on December 2nd 1945, the British government still had not recognized the Albanian government and consequently between the two countries didn't exist diplomatic relations.⁷⁸

Essential problem for Albania was no doubt her refusal to recognize the previous signed treaties with the USA before 1939. However, from the research of the archival documents we see that in an article published in Daily Mail of 12 September 1946, Albania through its envoy in the UN at the Security Council, Tuk Jakova, handed a letter to the US officials through which informed that accepted the recognition of all the prewar treaties between the two countries.⁷⁹ According to Daily Mail this was the only stalemate that obstructed the establishment of relations between the two countries.⁸⁰ This was mostly media information which is not confirmed from the official papers of the time in the Albanian archives. It is a fact that the signed treaties between the two countries prior 1939, were never recognized as long as the communist regime in Albania stayed in power.

72 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 60, p. 1. On the refusal of Great Britain for Albania's membership in the UN.

73 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 62, p. 18. On the negotiations held in the UN for Albania's membership.

74 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 63/1, p. 1-3. Letter sent from A. Sobulev assistant of the General Secretary of Security Council Department in the UN.

75 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 87, p. 31. Letter from the Foreign Ministry of the People's Republic of Albania sent to Tuk Jakova, minister without portfolio, on 13 September 1946.

76 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1946, F. 152/1, p. 9.

77 *Ibid.*

78 *Ibid.*

79 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 28, p. 102. On the international situation of Albania.

80 *Ibid.*

According to the other newspaper Daily Telegraph of 9 November 1946, was informed of the departure of the American mission from Albania because it was considered as hopeless the possibility of finding an agreement in order to recognize the government of Albania.⁸¹ The State Department itself has made a public statement that the further staying of the American mission in Albania was now worthless.⁸² The American mission officially left Albania on 16 November 1946.⁸³ The Albanian government was informed on 5 November 1946, with a note which clearly expressed the motive of the departure as a consequence of the unfriendly attitudes of the Albanian government, a thing that led to the failure of establishing regular diplomatic relations between the two countries.⁸⁴ The American government had expressed the desire for establishing regular diplomatic relations with Albania since 12 November 1945, with the only condition that the latter should recognize all the previous treaties that were signed between the two countries prior 1939.⁸⁵ Unfortunately everything would be useless nonetheless in this question was personally involved the Albanian former prime minister living in Boston, Fan Noli.⁸⁶

Indeed, the American mission has sent to prime minister Hoxha a note since 22 January 1946 and attached were all the agreements previously signed between the two countries.⁸⁷ The list of agreements started from 1928 with the treaty of arbitrage and the last was that of 27 August 1938 signed in Paris on Renunciation of War.⁸⁸ The indifferent attitude of the Albanian government to not recognize these treaties led to the inhibition of Albania to be a member of UNRRA.⁸⁹ The Albanian government had not accepted the recognition of the treaties and as a consequence until the second half of 1946, the relations between the two countries remained an overhanging problem. Watching the unchanged Albanian attitude,

81 *Ibid*, p. 109.

82 *Ibid*. Excerpt from the statement of the State Department: "Taking into consideration Albania's continuous lack of will to maintain these promises and obligations, the Government of the United States of America concluded that the American Mission in Albania cannot serve anymore for a valuable purpose".

83 *Ibid*, p. 114.

84 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 52, p. 29.

85 *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1946, F. 152/1, p. 9.

86 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 61, p. 2, 11, 12, 28, 66-69. Telegrams and letters from Fan Noli addressed to the Albanian government from 25 March 1946 to 30 September 1946.

87 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 44, p. 1-2. Note of the American Mission sent to the prime minister Enver Hoxha on 22 January 1946.

88 *Ibid*, p. 3-5; see also *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 52, p. 16.

89 *AMEPJ*, Y. 1946, F. 46, p. 7. Memorandum of the American Mission in Albania for not accepting the membership of the People's Republic of Albania in UNRRA, on 14 May 1946.

in November 1946, Bulgaria was the next country who recognized the Albanian government followed by Czechoslovakia in December of that year and after that was the French government who has sent a plenipotentiary minister when before had only a military mission in Albania. Until the first half of 1946, Albania had diplomatic representation only in Belgrade and in Moscow.⁹⁰

...to be continued.

⁹⁰ *AQSH*, f. 14/Str, Y. 1946, F. 152/1, p. 9-10.